Editor's Note
Over the past 10 years of China's innovative drug industry, Biotech has undeniably been the protagonist. The world has witnessed the birth of several great Biotech companies, with an increasing number of firms across different fields finding their niche and forging their own paths.
The second instalment of our China’s Innovative Drugs: A New Decade, A New Journey series focuses on the theme of the development trajectory of the sector. From a global perspective on industry ecosystem shifts, we highlight the unique stories of Chinese Biotech companies, exploring how they make critical decisions amid broader industry trends and their own microenvironments — and what factors shape their trajectories. More importantly, we aim to place these companies within the historical context of the industry, uncovering the underlying industrial and historical logic behind their growth.
The business development (BD) boom in China's innovative drugs sector is unstoppable, yet Chinese biotechs now face collective uncertainty about their strategic direction.
With fundraising challenges persisting in primary and secondary markets, BD has become biotechs’ primary funding source. In 2023, the total upfront payments from China’s outbound BD deals surpassed IPO proceeds for the first time. By 2024, BD upfronts exceeded total primary market financing.
While BD is expected to support the next phase of China's innovative drugs industry, new concerns emerge: By selling rights to core products, have biotechs lost future competitiveness? Are so many biotech companies obtaining funds by selling immature assets through BD ruining the future of China's innovative drugs?
Absent clear answers, the question becomes what Chinese biotechs can seize today.
Genmab, a European biotech known as the "BD King" in the industry, offers a solution to the concerns behind China's current innovative drugs BD boom through its 26-year development trajectory.
Since its establishment, Genmab has experienced multiple financial crises and cash flow crises, yet completed capability leaps through systematic BD strategies, transforming from an antibody technology platform company into a biopharma that has launched 8 global blockbuster drugs, achieved annual revenue exceeding USD 3 billion, and initially established a global R&D and commercialisation network.
Its development path neither avoided BD nor stopped at BD.
In its early founding stage, Genmab raised funds for key project ofatumumab's R&D through BD, while clarifying pipeline value through collaborations with large pharma companies, optimising project establishment and clinical research strategies to prevent drug development from becoming an isolated effort. During its golden growth period, Genmab collaborated with Johnson & Johnson (J&J) to develop daratumumab, retaining European market rights and participating in global clinical trial design to accumulate clinical development capabilities. In its transformation and expansion phase, Genmab integrated resources through BD, such as commercialisation collaborations with Seagen and acquiring ProfoundBio to establish presence in China, building a global self-development and commercialisation ecosystem.
Genmab did not idealised the value of BD. They once played the role of "working for Big Pharma" but never abandoned transformation. For Genmab, the BD model and becoming a biopharma are not opposing choices. BD itself does not define a company's ceiling; what ultimately determines the endgame is whether the company can transform it into systemic capabilities. Biotech companies that regard BD as a strategic lever still have opportunities to knock on biopharma's door.
Two Evolutions in the Capital Winter
Genmab could have gone bankrupt in 2010.
Had GlaxoSmithKline (GSK)'s R&D chief rejected new CEO Jan Van de Winkel's negotiation request about ofatumumab milestone payments during that phone call, ofatumumab might have missed its launch window. Genmab would have faced cash depletion within six months, and future blockbusters like Darzalex (a mega-blockbuster drug) and Tecvayli (the world's first BCMA/CD3 bi-specific antibody) might never have existed.
Genmab nearly collapsed much earlier too. Just three years after founding, its most capital-intensive core program Humax-CD4 failed its Phase II trial in lead indication rheumatoid arthritis (RA). Europe's primary and secondary markets were cooling despite a brief IPO window, leaving public investors unwilling to fund young companies like Genmab.
Winter never truly departed, but BD became biotechs' "antifreeze gene" and evolutionary ladder. For Genmab, the 2003-2005 and 2008-2010 winters were existential tests that refined its BD strategy into survival wisdom — and springboards for strategic reinvention.
During the first capital winter, Genmab followed parent company Medarex's playbook: weaving a safety net through intensive BD deals before markets bottomed out. Starting 2001, it partnered with larger players by co-developing an IL-15 antibody with Amgen, licensing its UltiMAbTM platform to Roche, and collaborating with Paradigm Therapeutics, Inc. on cancer/inflammation antibodies.
This strategy accelerated Genmab's clinical programs, positioning it advantageously when markets rebounded. By 2005-2006, Humax-CD4 attracted Merck Life Science, bringing USD 20 million licensing fees plus USD 50 million equity investment. GSK paid USD 102 million upfront plus USD 359 million equity for Humax-CD20 (ofatumumab).
BD's true value extended beyond financing — partners' R&D expertise validated Genmab's technology while their rigorous selection criteria helped reassess pipeline value. Merck's interest made Genmab recognise Humax-CD4's potential in psoriasis despite its RA failure, emboldening long-term bets.
The second winter began in 2008.
Genmab then peaked: GSK's massive upfront payment funded 20+ concurrent clinical programs with nearly USD 100 million annual revenue. Yet the global financial crisis pushed it to the brink.
The crisis stemmed from an ambitious USD 240 million US antibody plant acquisition in an attempt to control its destiny. But the financial tidal wave froze markets: investors fled, partners slashed budgets, and factory costs devoured cash. By 2010, Genmab's shares plunged 80%, its CEO departed, and bankruptcy loomed.
This time, BD wasn't about casting wide nets but serving as a pivot for strategic reinvention.
When key partner GSK restructured its oncology business, impacting co-developed ofatumumab, new CEO Jan van de Winkel negotiated emergency USD 135 million funding by forfeiting some autoimmune rights and milestone payments.
Genmab also exited non-core disease areas to focus on cancer antibodies. As Van de Winkel noted: "A small biotech shouldn't advance too many clinical programs simultaneously. Our mission is developing leapfrog products in one field".
Additionally, Genmab sold the factory at a fire-sale for USD 10 million, vowing never to own manufacturing again to reassure shareholders. These moves weren't just damage control, they freed resources to sharpen strengths. Markets saw not retreat but refocus: rather than burdening cash flow with heavy assets, Genmab would leverage CMOs/CROs and MNC partners' scale to concentrate on innovation.
Returning leaner, Genmab's antibody platform accelerated value creation while BD deals catalysed pipeline progress. Daratumumab, licensed in 2012, reached the market in just three years thanks to J&J's global Phase III trials. "We were too small to run multiple parallel Phase IIIs like J&J", Van de Winkel admitted.
Post-crisis Genmab converted BD gains into organic growth. Through negotiations with MNCs, it mastered pipeline valuation, profit-sharing models and clinical risk management — capabilities that later fuelled its internal R&D, becoming intangible assets for transformation.
Products Will Build a Truly Strong Company
Drug development is often a high-risk endeavour, and securing substantial milestone payments and sales royalties after receiving BD upfront payments is never easy — Genmab being no exception.
Since 2001, Genmab has entered multiple development collaborations with Roche. However, the OX40L-targeting antibody oxelumab and IL-13Rα1 antibody RG1671 were completely abandoned. The IGF-1R antibody teprotumumab advanced into 19 indications, with most halted during Phase II trials — only thyroid eye disease gained US FDA approval, while diabetic macular oedema and systemic sclerosis remain in slow-moving global Phase I studies. The IL-15 antibody ordesekimab (HuMax-IL15), co-developed with Amgen since 2006, faced setbacks across RA, psoriasis and celiac disease indications due to poor efficacy. Zanolimumab (HuMax-CD4), licensed to Merck, progressed to Phase II/III trials across 8 indications before disappearing without trace.
Fortunately, Genmab's early licensing strategy preserved several promising candidates, while its four antibody platforms — DuoBody, HexaBody, DuoHexaBody and HexElect — continue generating novel therapies.
Before 2018, Genmab's revenue growth primarily stemmed from milestone payments and new licensing deals. From 2015 onward, its commercialised products drove explosive growth — 67.85% in 2019 and 92.66% in 2020, reaching USD 1.55 billion. Daratumumab's rising global sales increasingly contributed through profit-sharing.
While products elevated Genmab's industry standing, they fell short of Jan van de Winkel's vision: "Products will build a truly strong company". When licensing daratumumab globally to J&J, Genmab likely never anticipated it becoming J&J's top-selling drug at USD 11+ billion annually (2024), with Genmab receiving merely ~15%.
To date, Genmab has delivered 8 commercialised products to partners, generating USD 20+ billion for them in 2024 versus Genmab's own USD 3+ billion revenue. By comparison, Regeneron's product-focused approach yielded USD 14.2 billion also last year.
This imbalance became evident earlier when J&J reduced daratumumab royalties in 2020, exposing licensing's fundamental flaw: without value chain control, innovation merely enriches others. With stronger finances, Genmab redesigned partnerships.
In its 2017 deal with Seagen for Tivdak and 2020 AbbVie agreement for Epkinly, GEN3009 and GEN1044 adopted 50:50 cost/profit splits. "We fund 50% to earn 50%, far exceeding initial royalties from Darzalex and Kesimpta", noted management.
Concurrently, Genmab built commercial capabilities. Following Epkinly's approval, it launched independent US/Japan sales — a first for the company. Recent deals reveal greater ambition as it transitions from seller to buyer. The 2022 Synaffix ADC license (USD 415 million total) and 2024 ProfoundBio acquisition (USD 1.8 billion) represent strategic moves to reclaim control and build pipeline moats.
Per February 2025 pipeline updates, Genmab now retains rights to 22 clinical programs (7 in Phase III), transitioning toward full ownership. Today's Genmab is no ordinary biotech, but a company using BD as stepping stones toward becoming a fully integrated pharmaceutical player.
The Door to Biopharma Remains Unlocked
As China's innovative drugs sector grapples with whether BD limits biotechs' growth potential, Genmab's 26-year journey demonstrates how all forms of BD can serve as springboards, provided companies convert partnership momentum into self-sustaining capabilities across global capital, clinical development, manufacturing and commercialisation.
Capital forms the foundation. After weathering two winters through BD, Jan van de Winkel recognised that building a major company requires diversified investors to bolster risk resilience, which calls for proactive investor restructuring.
Genmab's 2019 NASDAQ secondary listing, though seemingly belated, perfectly timed market sentiment. Seven consecutive profitable years with steady daratumumab royalties and early commercial success positioned it favourably. "Profitability gave us privileged market standing", noted Andrew Carlson, Head of Investor Relations. The USD 506 million raise fundamentally reshaped its investor base — over 50% US capital — balancing European conservatism against US investors' long-term tolerance.
Capital thus evolved from lifeline to strategic weapon. The US listing expanded Genmab's shareholder base while elevating its stateside profile for future independent commercialisation. Earlier collaborations on Tivdak and Epkinly had already yielded critical experience in co-promotion teams, distribution and market access, capabilities that are now supporting autonomous operations.
Genmab's capital strategy reveals deep understanding of true biopharma requirements: transcending geographical barriers demands more than contracts. Since 2015, it has strategically expanded globally alongside partnered products, now employing 2,200+ people across Denmark, the Netherlands, Japan and the US.
Its "product-led regionalisation" strategy combines technology acquisitions with local integration — exemplified by acquiring China's ProfoundBio to access Suzhou Industrial Park's research ecosystem while establishing Tokyo operations for direct Japanese commercialisation. This asset-light approach offers greater strategic depth than traditional MNC heavy investments, avoiding massive costs while accumulating local expertise.
Another unsung achievement is proactive supply chain management. Despite its "no factories" policy, Genmab recruited Rayne Waller, Amgen's 27-year manufacturing veteran, to oversee operations, maintaining flexibility while mitigating outsourcing risks through core control.
Today's Genmab retains biotech agility while exhibiting biopharma traits. Its hybrid ecosystem strikes a dynamic equilibrium, leveraging BD for cash flow without being defined by it, harnessing MNC strengths without becoming subordinate, and ultimately transforming short-term deals into enduring value through integrated capabilities.
For Chinese biotechs at their own crossroads, Genmab's story offers clarity: the biopharma door stays unlocked for those maintaining independent ambition while systematically building capabilities through participation in downstream development.
Surviving winters and thriving in fair weather are two sides of the same coin. The true watershed lies in converting each crisis into an opportunity to rebuild competitiveness — perhaps the ultimate answer to biotech development.